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Balochistan and Nationalism discusses a divided region in South Asia and their 
ideas of nationalism.  Balochistan is divided among three neighboring countries; Iran, 
Pakistan, and Afghanistan.  Each Balochi region within each country still maintains a 
sense of Balochi nationalism however with somewhat different ideals from one another.  
This paper discusses the history of the region and the people, and identifies in each region 
how their approach in the fight for self-determination developed and each region’s 
desired endstate. 
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Chapter 1:  Introduction 
"Our children walk barefoot on a golden soil." – Anonymous, Baloch proverb. 
 On February 17, 2012 Representative Dana Rohrabacher (CA) along with two co-
sponsors, Rep Louie Gohmert (TX) and Rep Steve King (IA), submitted House 
Concurrent Resolution 104.  House Concurrent Resolution 104’s title is “Expressing the 
sense of Congress that the people of Baluchistan, currently divided between Pakistan, 
Iran, and Afghanistan, have the right to self-determination and to their own sovereign 
country.”  Word of Concurrent Resolution 104 spread fast overseas and was met with 
harsh criticism from Pakistan almost instantly.  Pakistan’s Foreign Officer protested 
commenting, “The resolution is based on Ignorance and lack of understanding. This 
would be taken as clear interference in Pakistan’s internal affairs… (and warned) US 
authorities against any irresponsible step, asserting that such acts would not be 
tolerated.”1  Following, the US Embassy along with other US leaders reassured Pakistan 
that “the US respected Pakistan’s sovereignty and Balochistan was an internal matter of 
the country.”2 
  Yet there are several analysts who, in looking at US interests, believe that a self-
determining Balochistan is advantageous to the US and the rest of the Western world.  
Such as M. Hossein Bor’s “controversial assertion (which was later censored in Pakistan) 
that supporting an independent Balochistan stretching from "the Strait of Hormuz to 
                                                 
1 Unknown, “FO protests US Congress bill on Balochistan” (The Nation, February 18, 2012), 
http://www.nation.com.pk/pakistan-news-newspaper-daily-english-online/national/18-Feb-2012/fo-
protests-us-congress-bill-on-balochistan 




Karachi" would be a better policy approach than ongoing US efforts to counter the 
Iranian and Pakistani regimes.”3  On the flipside other analysts indicate that openly 
supporting Balochistan would contradict “three cornerstones of the Obama 
administration's current regional policy approach: 1) Normalizing relations with 
Pakistan's government and military; 2) Incorporating the Taliban into the current Afghan 
political system; 3) Overly accommodating an emerging Iran.”4 
  America’s political and strategic interests aside, Balochi nationalists/terrorists 
have been struggling to regain their Balochistan from Iran, Pakistan, and Afghanistan.  
This idea of an independent Balochistan is not new.  By taking a brief look at 
Balochistan’s history, to understand the people and cause of its division, I will argue that 
Balochs in Iran are rallying around a different cause than compared to the Balochs in 
Pakistan and Afghanistan and that the approaches taken by Iran, Pakistan, and 
Afghanistan towards their respective Balochistan regions have had a direct result on how 
the local populations and terrorist groups developed their ideology. Following the brief 
history of the region, I will discuss Iran and its approach to dealing with Balochistan, and 
the reactions exhibited by the Balochs towards the Iranian government.  This section will 
then be followed by a similar section involving Pakistan and its Balochistan province, 
then a section following the same pattern on Afghanistan.  Once the evaluations are 
complete some comparison between the three Balochistan provinces will be discussed.  
This paper will not attempt to debate the question of whether a self-determining 
                                                 





Balochistan is right or wrong, but instead investigate the cause and effects governments 




Chapter 2:  Background on Balochistan 
  Baloch nationalism straddles across borders of Iran, Pakistan and, Afghanistan.  
“Balochistan is in the northwestern province of Pakistan, bounded on the east by Sind, on 
the south by Arabian Sea, on the northwest by Iran, and on the northeast by Punjab and 
north by Afghanistan.”5  The geographical characteristics of Balochistan include six 
hundred miles of coastline, consisting of eight ports such as Gowader.  The exact 
boundaries of Balochistan, that is where Balcohs live in sizeable majorities, to this day 
remains uncertain.  “The Encyclopedia of Islam defines its boundaries as comprising the 
south-east part of the Iranian plateau from Kirman desert east of Bam and the Bashagird 
Mountains to the western borders of Sind and Punjab.”6  In comparison, The 
Encyclopedia Britannica “marks its boundaries as extending from Gomalriver in the 
Northeast to the Arabian Sea in the south, and from the borders of Iran and Afghanistan 
in the west and north-west to the Suleman Mountains and Khirthar Hills in the east.”7 
  Balochistan is also rich in natural resources including; iron, copper, gold, coal, 
manganese, and chromite.8  According to the Government of Balochistan’s official 
website, “Area wise Balochistan is the largest province of the country constituting about 
42% of the total land mass and has been endowed by nature with blessing of substantial 
mineral wealth mineral wealth which need(s) to be explored and developed in true 
                                                 
5 Dr. Mahmood Ali Shah, Essays on Balochistan: Society, Polity, and Tribal Administration (Lahore: 
Classic, 2008), 51. 
6 Mir KhudaBakhshMarri, Searchlights on Baloches and Balochistan, (Lahore: Ferozsons (Pvt.) Ltd., 
1997), 17. 
7 Ibid., 17. 




spirit.”9  It is because of these reasons that Balochistan was and remains such a contested 
area in the region.  In its long history Balochistan has “changed hands frequently between 
the great empires of ancient epochs.”10 
  Traditionally the Baloch were nomadic and focused on agriculture and livestock.  
While in contemporary times more Balochs are entering the fields of trade, commerce, 
and other professions, initially the Balochs were tribal and did “not have any masterly 
skill in trade and commerce.  It is something, which did not suit an ‘honorable 
Baloch’.”11 In terms of population “the urban population is only 15.6%.  The majority of 
the work force in the province comprises of peasantry and they constitute 69% of the 
total population.  A sizeable number of 17.5% are nomads and carry their homes on their 
backs.”12 
  Balochs also continue to use a tribal system, the Sardari (feudal) System, which 
consists of the tribal Sardar, who represents a powerful pressure group in the political 
system of the country and province.  There is a history of Sardars, since the time of the 
British; of being beneficial to the tribes they lead, but also of being corrupt and 
intolerable, as seen today.  The National Assembly in Pakistan abolished the Sardari 
System in May 1976, understanding the challenges of incorporating tribal government 
into more contemporary government.  This has weakened their power to some degree; 
                                                 
9 Government of Balochistan, “Mines and Mineral Development” http://www.balochistan.gov.pk/mines-&-
mineral-development.html 
10 Dr. Naseer Dashti, ed., In a Baloch Perspective, (Quetta: Asaap Pub., 2007), 29. 
11 Ibid., 6. 
12 Shah, Essays on Balochistan: Society, Polity, and Tribal Administration, 71. 
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however the Sardari System is still active throughout Balochistan due to the lack of 
literacy, economic development and good governance.13 
  The Balochs’ religious background is diverse, resulting from the many cultural 
changes they encountered due to their migratory culture and due to changing ruling 
empires.  In fact religion is the major factor holding the Balochs together, providing a 
base for unity and common social order.  “Before (the) Christian era the great Iranian 
religion, Zoroastrianism, had swept the entire region as far as Afghanistan, therefore 
Zoroastrian influences on the Baloch is visible.”14  With the introduction of Islam, the 
majority of Baloch converted to the Islamic faith.  The majority of Baloch are Hanafi 
Sunnis. There is also a community of Zikri Baloch and a small population of Shi'a.  There 
is a community of an estimated 500,000 to 700,000 Zikri Baloch, who are mostly found 
in the Makran area and in Karachi. The Zikris believe in the Messiah Nur Pak, whose 
teachings supersede those of the Prophet Muhammad. Their beliefs, considered heretical, 
have led to intermittent Sunni repression of their community since founding of the sect in 
the fifteenth century. It is interesting to note that in Balochi society they follow a resilient 
secular attitude towards religion despite growth of religious fanaticism elsewhere in Iran 
and Pakistan.  In Balochi culture, therefore, the religious preference is left of to the 
individual and considered a private matter.15 
  Baloch nationalism straddles across borders of Iran, Pakistan and Afghanistan. It 
also harbors the ambition of amalgamation of Brauhi, Balochs, and Sulemani Balochs 
                                                 
13 Dr. Riaz Ahmad, Balochistan Through History, (Islamabad: Quaid-i-Azam University, 2008), 30. 
14 Dr. Naseer Dashti, ed., In a Baloch Perspective, (Quetta: Asaap Pub., 2007), 17. 
15 Ibid., 18. 
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who speak different languages and a varied set of social customs and norms.  Over 
300.000 ethnic Baloch people inhabit the Afghan part of Balochistan, though the 
Pakhtoons or Pushtuns (Pathan) heavily populate the tract. The Pathan people also inhabit 
large tracts in Pakistani Balochistan. 
  The Balochs culture and customs carry a heavy sense of nationalism it itself, 
because the origin of Balochi culture can be traced back to Mesopotamia. The tribal laws 
of Balochistan play an important role in establishing the code of conduct that allows 
people to live and work within the premises of their cultural and traditional life.  The 
cultural landscape of Balochistan portrays various ethnic groups that speak different 
languages like Balochi and Pashtu, yet there are similarities found in their literature, 
beliefs, and customs.  “These strong traditions and cultural values are important to 
Baluch people and have enabled them to keep their distinctive ancient cultural identity 
and way of life with little change to this day. The culture and traditions of the Baluch 
have historically been passed down from mother to daughter, and men from father to 
son.”16 
  An important time in Balochistan history is the age of the Khanate of Kalat, 
which is attributed with being the emergence of the Balochi State.  “At the peak of its 
power, the Khanate of Kalate included the entire region of present day Pakistani 
Balochistan, and most of the Iranian and Afghani Balochistan…The Kalate State was a 
confederacy, with tremendous powers allowed to tribal leaders.”17After the formation of 
                                                 
16 “Baloch People,” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Baloch_people 
17 Dr. Naseer Dashti, ed., In a Baloch Perspective, (Quetta: Asaap Pub., 2007), 33. 
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the Kalat State, the British occupation marked another important time in the region’s 
history in 1839.  It is important because it is during Britain’s occupation that Balochistan 
was partitioned to Pakistan, Iran, and Afghanistan.  The result was the creation of the 
“Goldsmid Line” in 1871, forming the present boundary between Pakistan and Iran, and 
the “Durand Line” in 1893 between Afghanistan and Pakistan.18  This time period is not 
only significant because it divided Balochistan between three countries, but because it 
sparked the idea of Balochi nationalism and resistance towards foreign dominance. 
  
                                                 
18 Ibid., 37. 
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Chapter 3:  Balochistan History Under Imperialism 
  As stated briefly in the background, the region of Balochistan resides in three 
countries; Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan.  This chapter discusses imperialism and how it 
resulted in the tri-sectioning of the region.  The strategies used by the imperialist nations, 
most notably the British, towards Balochistan will also be discussed. 
  The origin of the Balochs is very much contested by many historians, scholars, 
and travel –writers throughout the nineteenth century.19  Balochs, like any other people, 
cannot claim to be devoid of an intermixture of other races.  Over course of many 
centuries, people of different racial, or ethnic, groups have joined the Balochs during 
their nomadic travels.  “In fact, one can notice streaks of Dravidian blood among the 
Brohi tribes of Kalat; and Medes, Rajput; and Afghan strains among the Baloches of 
Sind, Punjab and Balochistan.”20Marri, in the book Searchlights on Baloches and 
Balochistan goes so far as to provide three different dictionary meanings of the word 
‘Baloch’.  These definitions are stated below: 
Burhan-Katih – A famous Persian dictionary compiled by Mohammad 
Hussain bin Khalaf al-Tabrezi in 1651/52 at Hyderabad Deccan in 
India…defines ‘Baloches’ as “cock’s comb, crest, or the name of certain 
barbarous people who inhabit the mountains on the border of Kirman.  It is 
said that they are descended from the Arabs of Hejaz…Farhangi-Sarwari 
– Another dictionary, has to say this much: “Baloches are a people who 
inhabit the desert and plunder the caravans; and for the great part are 
warlike and good archers; they are also styled as ‘Koch’ and ‘Baloch’”.  
However, according to Francis Johnsons English, Arabic and Persian 
Dictionary, ‘Baloch’ means, “name of a wild tribe on the bank of Indus.”21 
                                                 
19 Marri, Searchlights on Baloches and Balochistan, 24. 
20 Ibid, 31. 




  As Marri later goes on to explain, the idea of what a Baloch is, or was, is based 
entirely on which part of the region the definer was looking at.  For example the border of 
Kirman and the idea that Balochs are descended from Arabs is based on the eastern part 
of the province, in Iran.  While on the other hand, the Persian dictionary version is based 
on the western portion of the province. 
  The British entered Balochistan as invaders, under the flag of imperial expansion, 
in the 1830s.  When the British Government began its rule in India’s subcontinent, 
Balochistan was sparsely populated.  Between 1838 and 1876 the British encountered 
strong armed opposition from the various tribes in the region.  Therefore after the British 
attained control of the region, the British adopted a new policy in the region, one that 
supported their divide and rule policy in India.  That policy was the Sandeman System; 
named after Robert G. Sandeman the first Agent to Governor-General of Balochistan.22 
  The Sandeman System contained four points that supported the divide and rule 
policy.  The first principle was that Sardars were to be the representative of the 
tribesmen, but were to be loyal and accountable to the British for the conduct of their 
behavior.  Secondly, they would maintain support of the British as long as they were 
successful in mobilizing support of the tribesmen in favor of British rule.  Thirdly, the 
Sardars were autonomous in the exercise of their duties regarding the affairs of their 
tribes, provided there was no threat of disobedience or uprising towards British rule.  And 
fourthly, the Sardars were not elected by their tribesmen, but rather chosen by the British 
                                                 
22 Dr. Ahmad, Balochistan Through History, 24. 
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and could therefore be replaced by the British.23  Britain’s participation in Balochistan’s 
political, administrative, social, and economic systems, as a result, was still under the 
chieftanship of Sardars, Maliks, and Khans.24  It has been argued that due to the nomadic 
nature of the Baloch tribes, and other tribes within the region, as well as the semi-hands 
off approach to governance within the region, Balochistan’s society remained 
underdeveloped.  Following the exit of the British Raj, and formation of independent 
nation Pakistan, Balochistan could have easily been transformed from the Sardar system 
to governance based on legislature representation.  However, “the system continued after 
independence in its entrenched form due to the lack of literacy, economic development 
and good governance.”25 
  Based on Balochistan’s census data the title of ‘backward people’ was attached to 
the region.  “Among every 1000 persons, there were totally 33 persons (31 males and 2 
females) educated in Persian and Arabic.  In 1911 only seven males and one female were 
literate in English…As regards (to) indigenous requirements, it may be mentioned that 
among every 1000, only 170 sayeds, 60 Lasi, 57 Jatt, 38 Baloch and 32 Brauhis could be 
considered literates in 1911.”26 
  The lack of education facilities and teachers in the late 1800s and early 1900s 
were the result of several factors.  However one of the biggest contributors was the Raj.  
The British policy of divide and rule and the Sandeman System allowed the British to 
                                                 
23 Ibid, 25. 
24 Ibid, 34. 
25 Ibid, 30. 
26 Ibid, 38. 
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govern Balochistan with minimal effort.  In doing so the British were able to overlook the 
task of improving, or in some aspects such as roads, and creating infrastructure in the 
region.  By maintaining a form of tribal rule in the region the job of creating schools, 
roads, and other infrastructure remained in the hands of the Sardars.  These are the same 
Sardars that were appointed by the Raj, and also controlled by the Raj. 
  Along the same lines, infrastructure and economic development were also poor.  
In fact the Balochs held occupations dealing largely in livestock, camel driving, and 
agriculture.27  During the time of the British Raj industrialization of Balochistan 
remained non-existent.  Despite the overflow of natural resources, to include sulfur, 
chromite, and coal, there was little in the way of industry to exploit these resources.  The 
industry that did exist in the region during this time period included building industries 
(such as well diggers, masons, house builders, and ceramics), food industries (such as 
four mills, bakers, butchers, and grain parchers), and metal industry (blacksmiths, 
tinsmiths, and gun makers).28  However these industries focused on producing items 
needed for everyday life and not the tools and refineries needed to extract and refine raw 
materials. 
  The Balochs’ nomadic lifestyle created a region that was also underdeveloped in 
the transport and communications realm.  Prior to 1882 there were no railway lines, post 
offices, or telephone houses.29  Following Britain’s arrival into the region railways and 
roads were built in Balochistan going in and out of Balochistan.  However it has also 
                                                 
27 Ibid, 41. 
28 Ibid, 43. 
29 Ibid, 45. 
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been argued by many, including Syed Iqbal Ahmad in his book Balochistan: Its Strategic 
Importance, that while the British did build railways and some roads in Balochistan, they 
“were built in furtherance of British strategic interests in the area, and not to benefit the 
people of Balochistan.”30 
  At first glance Ahmad’s statement may appear to echo sentiment felt by all in the 
region, however Dr. DeedarHussain Shah Rizvi wrote in an article, “Construction of Post 
Offices and telegraph houses was also started…Development of the means of transport 
and Communications on the modern lines expanded the scope of social and economic 
activity in the province.  Balochistan also moved towards the inclusion in the list of the 
provinces of India…The economic activity surged and moved towards the well being of 
the common man also.”31  Dr. Rizvi’s statement may hold true when taking a broad look 
at the region; however when the scope is narrowed and close attention is paid to where 
development was undertaken it becomes clear that the objective was Quetta and other 
larger cities in the region.  In turn, the target groups to benefit from such advancements 
were non-Balochs; Hindus travelling to the cities for job opportunities, British 
administrators travelling in and out of the region, etc.  After all, the literacy rates, 
educational statistics, type of employment held by Balochs in the region did not 
substantially improve.   
  But how would an underdeveloped Balochistan benefit any imperial power?  In 
regards to Balochistan and Britain, a backward province was exactly what Britain needed 
                                                 
30 Syed Iqbal Ahmad, Balochistan: Its Strategic Importance, (Karachi: Royal Book Co., 1992) 100. 
31 Dr. Ahmad, Balochistan Through History, 46-7. 
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in order to meets its security requirements.  Balochistan’s place in India’s sub-continent, 
and in the British Raj’s imperial colony, held a large strategic advantage.  Balochistan 
laid on the western edge of South Asia, while also laying on the eastern borders of the 
Middle East, as well as the southeastern border of Afghanistan (a portal/route for Russian 
expansion).  Balochistan’s importance was also identified by India’s leadership, namely 
the Congress’ Jawaharlal Nehru and the All India Muslim League’s Quaid-e-Azam 
Muhammad Ali Jinnah.   
  No sides wanted to readily give up Balochistan, because of its prime real estate.  
However at the same time Balochistan’s Khan of Kalat was pushing for Balochistan’s 
sovereignty.  The Khan, in March 1946, “substantiated his arguments by drawing 
parallels with the King of Nepal, who had an independent status, diplomatic privileges 
and immunities granted by His Majesty’s Government (HMG).”32  In comparing the 
treaties made between HMG and the Khan of Kalat and those also made with the kings of 
Nepal, Iran, and Afghanistan, the Khan’s argument does hold some legal validity.  
However Nehru disagreed, stating “the fact that Kalat is a border state adds to its 
importance from our point of view, as frontier areas are always strategic areas.  An 
independent India cannot permit foreign forces and foreign footholds such as Kalat might 
afford near its own territories.”33 
  The fear among the British and Indian government, prior to Indian and Pakistani 
independence, was that a self-determining Balochistan had the potential to pose security 
                                                 
32 Ahmad, Balochistan: Its Strategic Importance, 114. 
33 Ibid, 115. 
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issues for Britain and India.  First of all, Balochi tribes resided in British Raj India, Iran, 
and Afghanistan and continued to settle in all three regions, characteristic of their 
nomadic lifestyle.  Secondly, it was feared that should Balochistan become independent it 
may form alliances with other foreign nations, due to ethnic and tribal ties with 
neighboring countries. The result of creating new alliances would be the end of 
Balochistan’s position as a buffer between invading foreign forces, specifically Russia 
and Iran.  It is because of these two reasons that Balochistan was never granted 
sovereignty and following Pakistan’s independence in 1947 was annexed, an act that was 
contested by the Khan until he signed the Instrument of Accession on 27 March 1948, 
marking Balochistan as the last state of Pakistan.34 
  The history of Balochistan and its nomadic tribes traversing the region are diverse 
and rich in culture.  However through the age of imperialism, as newly independent 
countries began to take shape Balochs found their land being split among three countries, 
with little say in the matter.  Through the hardships of being neglected by imperial 
powers and left behind developmentally, to the lack of respect for their Khan, and not 
being recognized as an independent country the Balochs carry a lot of resentment to their 
current situations.  The result today is resistance towards their current governments in the 
form of terrorist and criminal actions.  
  
                                                 
34 Ibid, 120. 
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Chapter 4:  Iran and the Balochs 
  Iran’s Balochs are mainly residing in the Sistan-Baluchistan region in Southeast 
Iran.  The area consists of two sections, Sistan and Baluchistan.  The capital of the 
province is Zahedan, which is located in the Baluchistan region.  The region is the most 
underdeveloped and impoverished regions.  In addition it is one of the driest in the 
country.  As a result the Iranian government has been working to improve the area 
through programs such as the Chabahar Free Trading Zone.35 
  During the 1970s the Iranian government began to assist settlement and economic 
development by building dams and power plants but following the Iranian Revolution the 
new Iranian government reduced or ceased developments in the region.  Prior to the 
revolution there was a relatively insignificant force operating within the Baloch 
Nationalist Movement, when compared to its counterparts across the border in Pakistan.36   
The reason for the increase in activity from Baloch Nationalist groups is that 
discrimination against the Sunnis, and other minority religions, increased.  This was is 
due to Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini's interpretation of TwelverShi'ism as the religious 
base of the Islamic Republic.  As the Sunnis “were not a recognized category… (they 
were) disfavored in mosque buildings, representation, and other ways, partly owing to the 
economic underdevelopment of their regions and their cross-border ties.”37 
                                                 
35 Iran Chamber Society, “Provences of Iran: Province of Sistan and Baluchistan,”  
http://www.iranchamber.com/provinces/21_sistan_baluchistan/21_sistan_baluchistan.php 
36 Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization (UNPO), “West Balochistan” 
http://www.unpo.org/members/7922 




  With the increased discrimination Balochi nationalist movements, currently 
referred to as terrorist groups, began to build up.  Terrorist activity in the Sistan-
Baluchistan province was reported on several occasions in American newspapers such as 
a December 20, 1979 issue of The Progress, of Clearfield, PA.  The paper reported, 
“Fighting in Zahedan, broke out as "Dr.Yazdi"' — presumably top Khomeini lieutenant 
Ibrahim Yazdi, a former foreign minister — was delivering a speech. The report did not-
identify the "groups" that fought each other.”38  Although the reporter was not able to 
identify the groups, the story did indicate that it was religious based by writing, “It said 
the Sunni Moslem (sic) religious leader of the region, MowlaviAbdolaziz, issued a 
message to Zahedan citizens saying the disturbances were engineered by ‘enemies of 
Islam.’”39  It should be noted that MowlaviAbdolmalekAbdolaziz was a Sunni authority 
from Zahedan.  He was “prosecuted because of his complaints to the government for the 
regime’s discriminatory behavior towards Sunni and thus forced to go to Pakistan and 
was terrorized by the Islamic Republic agents in 1998.”40  Based on Abdolaziz’s standing 
in the Baluchistan province, it can be interpreted that when he refers to the “enemies of 
Islam” he is referring to the Iranian Shi’a majority. 
  Violence continued in Sistan-Baluchistan province, as the incident from 
December 20, 1979 gained momentum, as reported on December 23, 1979.  Reporters 
recounted, “Two persons were shot dead Saturday in renewed sniper fire, pushing the 
                                                 
38 Alexander S. Higgins, “Iran Hit by New Violence,” The Progress, December 20, 1979, 1.  
39 Ibid. 
40 “Statement by Special Representative on Iran,” Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Human Rights http://www.lightspeed.ca/personalpage/siamak/ghassemlu/United%20Nation.htm 
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known death toll in three days of shooting to 12. At least 73 others were listed as 
injured.”41  The paper reported that the Balochs were demanding a greater share in 
provincial administration following the ratification of Iran’s new Islamic constitution, as 
a result of the revolution.  When the Turkish-speaking followers of Ayatollah 
KazemSharitmadari were successful in the defiance of the Islamic regime in west Iran, 
winning major government concessions on managing their own affairs, the Balochs took 
it as a positive sign, and as a result the Baloch nationalist movements did not give up its 
fight for more representation and equality within the Iranian government through the 
1980s and early 1990s. 
  Riots followed in 1993 and 1994 following the destruction of Sunni mosques, in 
Masshad and other locations.  In addition a number of Sunni leaders, both Baluchi and 
Kurd, have died under suspicious circumstance, according to the 1996 Human Rights 
Report.  In it the report states, “On January 28, a 50-year-old Sunni cleric, 
MolawiAhamedSayyad, imprisoned by the Government from 1990-95, disappeared at 
Bandar Abbas airport. His body was found in a suburb of the city on February 2. 
Allegedly, six members of the Revolutionary Guards arrested him at the airport; he is 
believed to have died in their custody. In early March, 46-year-old Molavi Abdul Malek, 
a Sunni cleric and Iranian Balouch leader, was reportedly killed by Iranian intelligence 
operatives in Karachi.”42 
                                                 
41 “Iran Fights another Minority Challenge,” Times-News, December 23, 1979, A-3. 




  Following his election in 1997, Mohammad Khatami “spoke and acted against 
such discrimination."43  Khatami was President from 1997-2005, but following his 
presidency was Mahmud Ahmadinejad, who returned Iranian policy to reflect Islamic 
revolutionary policies.  
  Coinciding with the violence, human rights violations, and discrimination 
occurring in Sistan-Baluchistan the Iranian government was making progress, 
economically and infrastructure-wise, in the region.   Such projects were the largest dam 
in the province built in Pishin for agricultural purposes in 1990.  A highway system 
running from Zahedan to Tehran, a rail line from Zahedan to Quetta, and a rail line from 
Zahedan to Kerman in central Iran. Zahedan is also served by an international airport.  
This infrastructural investment is attributed to the free trade zone in Chabahar which 
became active in 1995.  “There is a dock in Chabahar Free Zones which harbors ocean-
going vessels and facilitates loading and unloading of up to 2000000 tons of goods per 
year...The high priority projects in Chabahar free trade zone are; Desalination plant, Oil 
Refinery petrochemical projects, Sea side resorts, Fishery industries, Auto 
Manufacturing, Power plant, etc.”44 
  The main terrorist group operating within Iran’s Sistan-Baluchistan Province is 
the People’s Resistance Movement of Iran (PRMI), also known as Jundallah.  In a letter 
to several world leaders (including President Obama), PRMI’s leader Abdul Malik Regi 
outlines the overarching goal of the PRMI.  As stated in the letter it is, “Our long-term 
                                                 
43 Keddie, Modern Iran: Roots and Results of Revolution, 312.  




objective is to work for the establishment of a democratic Iran where all citizens, no 
matter to which ethnic group or religious sect they belong, enjoy justice and equal rights 
under a federal system and their right to self-determination is respected.”45 
  Based on PRMI’s goal, as projected in Regi’s letter, the group is not demanding a 
separate country for the Iranian Balochs.  As has always been the case in Iran history, the 
Sunni Balochs are striving to overcome the discrimination and human rights violations 
imposed on them, and achieve equality within Iranian society and government.  The 
flipside is the tactic used by the PRMI to accomplish this task; violence.  The result is a 
relabeling of the organization on the global front to terrorist organization.  Regi claims in 
the letter above that they are forced to ‘stoop down to their level’ because passive actions 
are ineffective.   
  It has also been observed that militants conducting terrorist acts in Baluchistan are 
criminals, making use of poor border security along Pakistan and Afghanistan.  A large 
portion of those criminals are involved in drug trade/smuggling.  However, according to 
United Nations officials, Iran is a consumer country and transit country.  In fact there are 
many occasions when Iranian security forces have had shoot-outs with drug traffickers.  
In order to make investigations easier, these criminals are categorized as Baloch 
terrorists, and it is hard to determine whether or not these claims are true or not. 46 
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  Based on the past history of Iran and its dealings with the Sunni minority it is 
evident that, in general, the Balochi community in Sistan-Baluchistan has been yearning 
for equality and a sense of self-determination.  For this group of Balochs self 
determination comes in the form of an equal political voice at the local and national 
levels.  The improvements to the region in the form of the trade free zone and 
infrastructure development are also providing the Balochs the opportunity to slowly 




Chapter 5:  Pakistan and the Balochs 
  Balochistan in terms of area is the largest province in Pakistan, covering 
approximately 347,188 square km of area in the country.  The Balochistan province in 
Pakistan, as stated previously, is mostly uninhabitable, but rich in natural resources.  The 
land is also arid and dry making it suitable for herds of goats and sheep.  Just as in Iran, 
the Balochs are mostly nomadic due to the geography of the region.  There are few 
irrigated lands for agriculture, but those are small and minimal.  Therefore a large 
majority of the Baloch population concentrate on herding and marginal agriculture.47 
  The Balochs, during the Kalat period, were living and working as an independent 
nation, loosely tied to India.  The British had declared in the Government of India Act, 
1935, that Kalat was an Indian state. As a part of the Indian colony, Kalat would be given 
an option.  The Khan of Kalat, Mir Ahmed Yar Khan, at the time of partition, was 
allowed to assert Kalat’s (Balochistan) independence.  The Khan of Kalat envisioned an 
independent Balochistan.  In order to ensure they remained self-determining following 
Britain’s exit, he along with his suzerainty, GhausBakhshBizenjo, an emerging Baloch 
nationalist, and AbdusSamad Khan Achakzai, an avowed Gandhian and the leader of 
Indian National Congress, campaigned to prevent the voting college from including Kalat 
in Pakistan. “Their efforts failed on 29 June 1947 and the selected Electoral College, 
                                                 




under pressure from the British Agents and Muslim League, voted in favor of 
Pakistan.”48 
  Following Partition in 1947 from India, Pakistan was in disarray.  During 
Pakistan’s first decade of independence economic disparity between East Pakistan 
(Bangladesh) and West Pakistan became evident.  This was one of many factors that lead 
to the civil war in 1971, creating an independent Bangladesh.  As Pakistan moved on, 
without Bangladesh, it turned its focus towards the Punjab and Sind provinces as 
economic progress began to increase.  The result was Balochistan’s economic progress, 
along with the North West Frontier’s, began to fall behind.49 
  The sense of being neglected by Pakistan only increased the Balochs’ sentiment 
of discrimination.  Knowing that they, the Balochs, were handed to Pakistan by the 
British, without having any voice in the matter, the Balochs began to sow the seeds of 
dissent.  Economic progress with Balochistan would not occur until 1970.  “One (reason) 
among them was the fear that Balochistan will not be the part of Pakistan…Balochistan 
was divided into two divisions, Quetta and Kalat.  In 1970…Balochistan became for the 
status of a province of Pakistan.”50  These are two of the reasons why Balochistan 
developed into a poor and weak province within Pakistan. 
  Up to and throughout the 1990s, the economic situation in Balochistan changed 
very little, with most of the economic development in Balochistan centered on Quetta due 
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to its population density.  In the rural parts of Balochistan mining the natural resources 
has begun, but a majority of the income does not stay in the Balochistan province for 
further developments in infrastructure or social services.  One of the biggest examples of 
such a situation is the Sui natural gas field in Balochistan.  In addition to being the largest 
province in Pakistan, Balochistan is also home to Pakistan’s largest gas field, producing 
45% of the country’s supply.  But with all that gas production Balochistan remains poor 
“with 45 percent of the population living below the poverty line. There is rising 
resentment in the province that despite the fact that its natural gas generates $1.4 billion 
annually in revenue, the government remits only $116 million in royalties back to the 
province.”51 
  In addition to gas production, Pakistan has plans for Balochistan’s port city 
Gwadar, on the Arabian Sea.  Pakistan along with the support/partnership of China is 
building a $1.1 billion deep water port.  China has invested $200 million into the first 
phase, with promises of more money for development in the region.  With the promise of 
an India-Iran natural gas pipeline also being planned, it is surprising to see Balochistan 
drop down to the poorest province in the country. 
  The Balochs are not happy and view their situation as dire due to their economic 
inequality with the rest of the country, not including the North West Frontier.  The 
feelings of discrimination compounded on the fact that their belonging to Pakistan was 
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not by choice provides additional arguments for a self-determining Balochistan.  
Compound this with their long history of resisting foreign dominance. 
  Resisting Pakistan, for the Balochs, is the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA).  It 
has been reported that the BLA was organized by the USSR during the Russo-Afghan 
war composed of a left-wing student organization, the Baloch Students Organization.  In 
2006 it was officially labeled a terrorist organization under the Terrorist Act of 2006 by 
the United Kingdom. 
  The Balochistan Liberation Army targets Pakistani are indiscriminate on who they 
target.  However they have been known to target government leaders and facilities.  One 
example is the Sui Gas facility, which was targeted on March 26, 2009.  In that incident 
the BLA blew up two gas pipelines in Sui and DeraBugti as a result gas supply to parts of 
Sind including Karachi was suspended.52 
  Another example of Baloch freedom fighters targeting natural resource companies 
was conducted by another Balochi terrorist group, the Baluch People’s Liberation Front 
(BPLF).  The BPLF has been around since 1973 and is believed to, at some point, have 
received funding from India and Afghanistan.  The BPLF “claimed that it had carried out 
the rocket attack on the Chinese Oil and Gas exploration team in Sunny region… (and) 
said that the BPLF would continue to carry out such attacks on survey teams and not 
allow anyone to plunder it resources.”53  One civilian driver was killed and three civilians 
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from the survey team were injured during the May 9
th
 attack.  The attack was successful 
in discontinuing surveys in the area for some time. 
  On March 30, 2002 the BLA once again claimed responsibility for an attack, this 
time on the Frontier Corps, a federally controlled paramilitary force in Pakistan.  The 
BLA stated, “The attack was in retaliation for the murder of its members near Kalat on 
the 7.1.02.  The email read that they will continue their struggle against the Punjabi 
establishment, army and its stooges until they liberate Balochistan from this repressive 
and fascistic Pakistan.”54  
  “On another occasion Baloch Pro-independence leader and Guerrilla Commander 
Dr. Allah NazarBaloch, in a statement, said that on April 18 Tehreek e Nafaz e Aman has 
issued a threat to the newspapers and media to target his young sons NodanBaloch and 
Tamoochan Baloch” in order to pressure him to surrender.  Dr. Allah NazarBaloch 
continues with his statement comparing the Balochs to Bengalis stating, “Just like 
Pakistan Army could not stop the Bengalis to achieve their independence after mass 
murdering three million of their population, similarly they cannot stop the Baloch 
movement with the genocide of Baloch.”55  By comparing the Balochs situation to that of 
the Bengalis in Bangladesh Dr. Allah NazarBaloch is giving his fellow Balochs the 
courage and hope needed to continue their fight.  As a final exhibit of determination on 
his part, he says, “It will be an honor for a member of independence struggle like me if 
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mine or my children’s blood is used for the irrigation of freedom movement.”  He 
mentions again to build reinforcement the importance of gaining Balochistan’s 
independence. 
  In Pakistan’s Balochistan Province the Baloch have been struggling to find 
economic equality and success.  Rather than accept the outcome, and remain content with 
a semi-nomadic agro-pastoral lifestyle the Balochs are fighting for their own social and 
economic rise.  The means they have available are various militant nationalist groups, all 





Chapter 6:  Afghanistan and the Balochs 
  Afghanistan’s Balochistan region lies along its southern border running along 
both Iranian and Pakistani borders.  The region, much like the regions found in Iran and 
Pakistan are composed of mountainous rugged terrain, and dry flat lands.  Afghani 
provinces that contain a Baloch presence are Nimroz, Helmand, Kandahar, and Farah.  
The province with the largest Baloch presence is the Nimroz province, followed by 
Helmand. 
  Afghanistan’s history with the Balochs began with the drawing of the “Durand 
Line” in 1893 and Afghanistan received a small portion of Balochistan at its southern 
border.  There is not too much information on the Baloch’s integration into Afghanistan’s 
administration.  This is mostly due to the fact that Afghanistan’s early years, prior to the 
Russian-Afghan War, was governed by both tribal and state governments.  Such times in 
Afghanistan’s history include the Mohammed Zahir Shah era (1933-1973), and the 
Taliban era (1996-2001), when central authorities ceded significant power to tribal 
leaders. “Part of the recipe for stability [during Zahir Shah's tenure] was a competent, 
legitimate central government that had the ability to establish order in urban areas of the 
country ... and a tacit agreement with local tribes, subtribes, and clans in rural areas of the 
country."56 
  In regards to the issues facing Balochs in Iran and Pakistan, the Afghani Balochs 
were not facing discrimination or under-representation from the Afghani government.  
                                                 




This was due largely to the fact that representation at higher government levels was not 
of the most importance to a province that was, and still remains, mostly nomadic.  The 
tribal system of governing at the local/tribal level suffices for all of their daily needs.  
This type of system decentralizes the Afghanistan government and prevents them from 
disturbing the natural order of the tribes.   
In more contemporary times, The U.S. Army has “deployed anthropologists to 
help its troops understand the shifting mosaic of tribal interest groups. In Parliament in 
December, Britain's prime minister, Gordon Brown …said Britain needed to “understand 
the tribal dynamics”. ”57  The Taliban, a terrorist group operating in Afghanistan, 
understands this point as they are quick to make allies with individual tribes, when these 
tribes have feelings of inequality of discrimination from the government, to increase their 
support chain and/or recruitment numbers.58  For Baloch tribes, which are largely 
nomadic and small, this poses a threat.  This is because they, the Baloch tribes, can be 
easily influenced, whereas “the provinces where tribal structures are strongest, such as 
Paktia, Paktika and Khost, have proved most resistant to Taliban encroachment.”59 
  The economic situation in Afghanistan’s Balochi provinces, however, is similar to 
both Iran and Pakistan.  All three Balochi regions, from all three countries, remain the 
most underdeveloped parts of each country.  The lack of education, combined with their 
nomadic lifestyle, does not allow for them to have much upward mobility, in terms of 
                                                 







better jobs, working in cities such as Kandahar and Helmand.  When there is lack of 
financial stability, terrorist groups identify this as a vulnerability they can use to their 
advantage.  Compound this with the small, nomadic Balochi tribes and the terrorist 
groups, such as the Taliban, see a suitable recruitment base. 
  The economic situation in Afghanistan’s Balochi provinces has created an 
environment that is cultivating the illegal drug business.  The southern portion of 
Afghanistan is of vital importance to the drug trafficking rings, as it is a portal, much like 
the Silk Road during the 19
th
 century, for opium production and smuggling.  When a 
province or region with a dire economic outlook is faced with an enticing offer of quick 
cash, nine times out of ten that region is going to choose the quick cash.  This is the case 
in Afghanistan’s Helmand, Kandahar, and Nimroz districts, to name only a few.     
  In the bigger cities of Helmand and Kandahar the drug trafficking business is the 
largest in the country, if not the world.  The district in Helmand is the largest producer of 
opium in Afghanistan producing 75%.  In relation to the world, Afghanistan is the 
world’s largest producer producing 90% of the world’s opium and Helmand the largest 
province producing 42%.60  With these types of numbers the demand for farmers and 
smugglers is high, and with a large number of poor Baloch’s, along with Pashtun and 
other tribes in the region, willing to break the law for fast money the supply is also high.  
The decision to break the law is, of course, made a little easier when taking into account 
that in the border areas the law/policing units are small and powerless. 
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  Drug and weapons smuggling consumes a majority of the interest and efforts of 
all three countries, and rightly so this type of contraband are useful tools in destabilizing 
a country dealing with terrorism.  However consumer goods are also smuggled across the 
borders on a daily basis.  Smuggling of this type is generally from Iran and Pakistan into 
Afghanistan and is in the form of flour, cooking oil, and blankets.  Afghani Balochs and 
Balochs from the other provinces in Iran and Pakistan smuggle these into Afghanistan 
because these are consumable goods which are easily sold, thus providing some 
economic stability.  “The local society condones smuggling, pointing to the laghris’ 
(Pashtun for naked, referring to their economic status) need for a source of income in an 
otherwise limited economy. The border guards also largely condone it and charge a 
minimal ‘fee’ of Rs. 10 (approx. 22 cents) per trip.”61 
  The Balochi ties between Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran are advantageous for 
drug smuggling and smuggling of other contraband.  The advantage of having these tribal 
ties has provided Balochs from either country crossing borders to seek refuge or trade.  
Afghani Balochs have a history of making use of the lax border security and Baloch 
identity.  Baloch identity and support for the other Balochs across the borders is strong 
because at time or another Balochs have had to flee across the borders, whether it be the 
Taliban's violence, the Ayatola's repression, or Islamabad's iron fist.  This accessibility to 
Pakistan and Iran has also increased cross-border Balochi relations, as the prospect of 
economic stability became more prominent with the weapons and drug trade.   
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  Balochi nationalism also evolved due to its history.  Although, Afghani Balochs’ 
nationalism was a result of not only Afghanistan’s actions, but also a result of Iranian and 
Pakistani actions towards the Balochi tribes.  Balochs from the neighboring countries of 
Iran and Pakistan have always had a cross border relationship.  The fact that a majority of 
the Balochs were, and still are, nomadic allowed for freedom of movement.  In the early 
years, dating back to before the Durand Line, the moves were mainly a result of seasonal 
agriculture or the need to follow herds for sustenance.  However in the contemporary 
period it was to escape discrimination, which has resulted in some tribes being stretched 
out between two, or even all three, countries.62 
  Since the 1980s, Afghan refugees have settled in Pakistan’s Balochistan province, 
mainly in and around Quetta.  The reason many Balochs chose Quetta over other parts of 
Pakistan because of the ethnic commonalities they shared.  However, these refugees do 
not seek feel the immediate sense of wanting repatriation.  That is because the Afghan 
Balochs have a different sense of nationalism towards their ‘homeland’; Afghanistan.  
For Balochs “perceptions regarding Afghanistan are highly individualised and shaped by 
place of origin and ethnicity... (and) land disputes, as well as the absence of social 
services, are other discouraging factors in the decision to return.”63  One drawback of 
moving to refugee camps in Pakistan is that they trade one level of economic despair and 
security issues for another.  While the economic opportunity may be better, to some 
degree, in Quetta, the discrimination from Pakistanis towards Balochs is evident.  Sher 
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Muhammad, age 21, residing in the Saranan Camp outside of Quetta, said, “When we 
mind our own business, we feel no different from Pakistanis. But the moment we have a 
fight with a local, everyone including the administration differentiates between locals and 
us.”64This is an interesting look at how governments view refugees, because in 
Afghanistan and Pakistan Balochs are not necessarily singled out and discriminated 
against by ethnicity, yet in Pakistan the Afghani Balochs are discriminated against for 
being refugees. 
  The Afghani Baloch’s idea of nationalism has been influenced by the nationalist 
fight being witnessed across the borders in Iran and Pakistan.  The religious 
discrimination being faced by Balochs in Iran was similarly felt by Afghani Balochs and 
the Taliban’s religious extremism.  As previously mentioned, the Baloch believe that 
someone’s religious preference is private and not something to be forced on one another.  
It is that cultural belief that contradicts the Taliban’s practices of suppressing women and 
covering women’s faces in public, as an example, are not practiced by Balochs living in 
Helmand, Nimroz, and other provinces.   
  In addition, the Balochs have a history of forming militant groups to oppose the 
Taliban and other discriminatory groups, to include the support of Balochs in Iran and 
Pakistan.  One such group is the Partisans of National Liberation of Afghanistan (PNLA), 
also known as the Nimroz Front or Southern Alliance.  The PNLA is a nationalist 
guerrilla organization formed in 1979 in Nimroz and led by Abdul KarimBrahui, who 
was later of governor of Nimroz in 2011.  According to Brahui the PNLA “was 
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essentially a Baloch group but there were also Pashtuns. We took shelter in Iran and 
conducted guerrilla operations against the enemy inside Afghanistan.”65  The PNLA 
initially conducted operations against the Russians and then continued operations against 
the Taliban as they took control of the Afghani government.66 
  Afghani’s Balochs appeared to be unaffected by the fact that they were a minority 
because of Afghan’s method of governing.  This however did not mean that the Baloch 
were not involved in the Russian occupation or the over-arching control of the Taliban.  
The Baloch’s culture and traditions in this instance were a factor in creating a 
nationalistic guerilla force to resist Russian and Taliban pressures.  Economically, the 
Balochs are in the same situation as its Iranian and Pakistani counterparts.  The economic 
development is slow and not necessarily targeted towards the nomadic Balochs. 
  
                                                 






Chapter 7:  The Balochs’ Nationalism – a Comparison 
  The Balochs, whether in Iran, Afghanistan, or Pakistan, share the same culture 
and history.  A history which I believe is still part of their ideology.  Up until the Kalat 
period the Balochs were forced to live under the rule of a foreign ruler or empire.  That 
experience, although not a part of their living memory, carries over through traditions and 
folklore to the Balochs living today.  And whether someone believes it or not, the 
experience of being dominated generations ago plays a role in formulating a society’s 
ideals.  In all cases Iranian Balochs, Pakistani Balochs, and Afghani Balochs feel the 
strain of being discriminated against.  However, the type of discrimination, and root 
cause are different.   
  In the Iranian Balochs case the source of discrimination is religion.  More 
specifically, how the leaders in a post-revolutionary Iran interpreted that difference 
between Shi’a and Sunni Muslims.  This resulted in a minority group with no rights, 
living in fear and uncertainty.  Being able to pull from past experiences via history and 
traditions the Iranian Balochs roused up their sense of Balochi nationalism and began to 
demand their due equality.  I further argue that Khatami’s reversal of the 
TwelverShi'ismduring his presidency provided the Iranian Balochs a view, albeit a short 
view, of what life would be like under Iran, when represented equally.  That may also 
explain why terrorist actions resumed following Khatami’s departure from office, 
because the Iranian Balochs found themselves discriminated for their religious 
preferences.   
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  In Pakistan the Pakistani Balochs also found themselves feeling discriminated 
against, and not getting a fair shot at what was rightfully theirs.  In Pakistan’s case, 
however, the Balochs were not seeking religious equality and equal representation within 
the government machine.  The Pakistani Balochs dispute is regarding their economic 
disparity compared to other provinces in Pakistan, particularly Punjab and Sind.  The 
Pakistani Balochs are aware of the natural resources available in their ancestral home, yet 
when Pakistan begins to gain access to these resources the Balochs notice that they are 
not getting their fair share of the revenue.  Therefore the feeling of being cheated and 
suppressed from economic prosperity the Pakistani Balochs also began to rally around the 
idea of Balochi nationalism.  Except in this case, the Pakistani Balochs are demanding the 
right to self-determination. 
  In Afghanistan the Balochs also faced discrimination, but I believe that in 
Afghanistan the Balochs pulled from both the Iranian and Pakistani experiences.  In 
regards to the Iranian experience, the Afghani Balochs also began to feel the pressures of 
religious extremism from the Taliban in the late 1980s and early 1990s.  The 
unwillingness to conform to the Taliban’s practices partly resembled the Iranian Balochs’ 
plight in Iran; expect that it does not appear that the Afghani Balochs wanted more 
representation at the national level.  As an alternative, the Afghani Balochs were fighting 
to expel the Taliban from their region so they could return to their own version of tribal 
governance.  The economic situation in Afghanistan is similar to both the Iranian and 
Pakistani Baloch regions.  It is because of the poor economic condition that criminal 
activity blossomed in the Balochi provinces of Afghanistan.  This spike in criminal 
37 
 
activity is not part of Balochi nationalism, on the Afghani Baloch’s part, as I believe it is 
purely for economic gain.  However the smuggling on the receiving end in Iran and 
Pakistan may have some part in those regions’ nationalist movements. 
  There are two more factors which are common to both countries and their 
respective Balochistan, which I will refer to as the flashpoint and success story.  In both 
cases the outcomes directly resulted in the type of ‘demands’ set forth by either 
Balochistan province. 
  In regards to Iran, its flashpoint was the Iranian Revolution in 1979.  It was this 
event that brought about a change in religious thinking in Iran, which in turn took away 
many religious and human rights away from the religious minorities, such as the Sunni 
Balochs.  As far as the success story, for the Iranian Balochs it is the success of the 
Turkish-speaking followers of Ayatollah Kazem Sharitmadar.  I believe that by seeing 
the successes they had in gaining political equality, the Iranian Balochs, for the most part, 
believe that having their voice heard in Iranian government is possible. 
  The Pakistani Balochs also experienced a flashpoint and success story of their 
own.  Undoubtedly the flashpoint in Pakistan is the partition in 1947.  I believe this is the 
point when things changed for the Pakistani Balochs because during the initial ten years, 
or so, Pakistan’s government and administration was chaotic and was not able to focus on 
all the provinces.  As a result, Balochistan was sacrificed for other provinces showing 
more immediate economic possibilities.  This, more so than the involuntary inclusion into 
Pakistan, is what planted the seed of dissention.  The success story that helped plant that 
seed firmly was Bangladesh’s Independence in 1971.  Following their independence, 
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Balochistan’s nationalist movement began to rally around the banner of self-rule and self-
determination.  After all, if Bangladesh could do it, why couldn’t they? 
  The Afghani Baloch’s flashpoint, uniting them under a nationalist cause, was the 
actions being taken by their fellow Balochs in Iran and Pakistan.  I argue that upon 
witnessing the religious discrimination in Iran and the actions being undertaken by the 
BLA, the Balochs in Afghanistan began to demand that their provinces, Nimroz, 
Helmand, and Farah, not be included in Afghanistan and its newly developed 
government. In 2001, following 9/11 and Operation Enduring Freedom, the Balochistan 
News Service reported, “Different tribal and ethnic groups are trying to control their 
areas and declaring their autonomy from a non existing central authority in 
Afghanistan… The decision was taken unanimously by a tribal Jirga (tribal assembly of 
elders) recently held in Nemroz province.”67  This is another piece of evidence in which 
tribal people within the Balochistan regions voicing their idea of nationalism and desire 
for self-rule. 
  
                                                 





Chapter 8:  Conclusion 
  Balochi nationalism is an idea that spans three countries.  In each country it also 
appears that the official nationalism of each country, at one time or another, was in 
opposition to Balochi nationalism, thus creating Balochi nationalist movements like the 
PRMI, BLA, and PNLA.  Benedict Anderson wrote in Imagined Communities “that 
nationalism has to be understood by aligning it, not with self-consciously held political 
ideologies, but with the large cultural systems that preceded it, out of which – as well as 
against which – it came into being.”68  Anderson goes on to identify two systems relevant 
in a nation’s cultural history; religion and dynasty.   
  In terms of the Balochs, it is evident that they rally around their cultural beliefs, 
and when discussing the religious realm Balochs believe in religious tolerance.  Having 
gone through several religious conversions in their history, from Zoroastrianism to Islam 
for example, the Balochs are not discriminatory towards other faiths and take offense of 
religious oppression.  The Balochs therefore are an example of how the tenet of religion 
in their culture has been essential in bolstering Balochi nationalism. 
  The second system argued by Anderson was the dynastic realm.  This has, and 
continues, to keep the Balochi nationalistic ideal alive.  Balochs, after being ruled by 
many, eventually formed their own dynasty in the Khan of Kalat.  Following the 
Imperialistic British division in the Durand Line and Goldsmid Line in late 1800s, the 
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Kalat was dissolved.  However the Balochs, especially those in Pakistan, have continued 
to rally around the Kalat as a nationalistic symbol and legitimizing tool for sovereignty. 
  The Balochs are the Kurds of Central Asia, forced to be divided among three 
Islamic nations.  Each region has remained to have cultural ties to the others; however 
each region approaches its idea of nationalism and overall goal slightly different, from 
complete independence to equality and greater representation in existing government.  
The commonality among all three is that they are sitting on top of land rich in natural 
resources, which remain underdeveloped, resulting in a stagnant economy with barefoot 
children walking on golden land.  The three governments’ approach towards the Balochi 
plight therefore is the direct cause of three different nationalist movements, among a 
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